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SUPPLY CHAINS: AGO-ANTAGONISTIC SYSTEMS THROUGH CO-






Abstract ¾ Supply chain configurations, as hybrid governance structures, allow companies to be sufficiently 
integrated while keeping a certain level of flexibility. This enables them, on one hand, to converge towards 
common interests through the development of cooperation; and on the other hand, to diverge on their own 
interests by remaining in competition. This dynamics generates an ago-antagonistic system where both of 
these two concepts, namely cooperation and competition, simultaneously drive the supply chain. In the present 
article,  this  system  is  analyzed  by  using  the  co-opetition  game  theory  developed  by  Brandenburger  and 
Nalebuff (1996) in order to highlight the importance of such an apprehension of the supply chain approach.   
 
Keywords ¾ Supply chain, cooperation, competition, ago-antagonistic approach, co-opetition game theory. 
INTRODUCTION 
These last years, companies has been evolving in a complex environment characterized by open markets, 
globalization of supply, increasing demand but also by consumers who are becoming increasingly hard to 
please in terms of product quality and service. This has prompted them to focus on their core competencies 
[1]-[2], by outsourcing non-generating value activities, yielding a growing number of small and medium 
companies. This densification has resulted in more complex flows (material, informational and financial), 
increasing, therefore, uncertainty about the environment. This has resulted in an increase in the variability of 
demand, reducing, consequently, visibility for companies [3], but also and above all increasing difficulty for 
rationalizing flows throughout the value system in the terms of Porter [4]. To cope with such constraints, firms 
have adopted new business models and new organizational configurations around the notion of networks. 
These were achieved by the advent of ‘supply chains’, which, in the terms of Miles and Snow [5], represent 
central organizing units in nowadays’ industries.  
Supply chain is a hierarchical, dynamic and processual network, made up of a set of companies (from the 
first  supplier  to  the  end  customer),  linked  by  upstream  and  downstream  flows  (physical,  informational, 
financial and knowledge) and different level relationships, established in order to satisfy the customer through 
better coordination and integration, but also greater flexibility and responsiveness. The supply chains can be 
presented as inevitable phenomena arising from a need for coordination and flexibility among a number of 
companies. In this sense, supply chains exist, whether managed or not [6]. 
Currently, cooperative paradigm dominates supply chain management (SCM) approach. In this paradigm, 
SCM is based on a systemic approach. It identifies the supply chain as a whole which is greater than the sum 
of its parts, not as a fragmented set of entities, against which each one acts for its own [7]. This approach is 
characterized by a certain number of concepts such as integration, coordination, collaboration, information 
sharing, common interests and mutual competitive advantage. However, when we speak about integration in 
SCM, we do not mean vertical one. Entities in the supply chain are autonomous and the supply chain itself is a 
dynamic network with actors that appear and disappear over time.  
Another paradigm focuses on the need of the development of competition between actors. In this way, 
based respectively on works of [8]-[9]-[10]-[11], Lado et al. [12] state that competition engenders economic 
efficiencies  by  enabling  companies  to  optimally  allocate  scarce  resources,  providing  the  impetus  for 
innovation and entrepreneurship, and reducing transaction costs between them. Furthermore, companies that 
constitute the supply chain are partially characterized by rationality and self interests. All this allow the supply 
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chain  to  be  agile  and  flexible.  These  conditions  are  necessary  to  cope  with  a  disruptive  and  unstable 
environment, and provide the possibility for change and innovation.  
In nowadays intellectual conception, both of these two paradigms become necessary and complementary 
at the same time. They are jointed under a third perspective which is a co-opetition one. In this article, we 
focus on this approach within supply chains, to underline the importance of both of these concepts that are 
paradoxical and complementary at the same time, and which constitute its principal motive. Such an approach 
will  be  analyzed  and  justified  through  ago-antagonistic  systems  theory  [13],  which  study  phenomena 
associating co-operation and conflict behaviors. After that and it’s the second aim of the article, we will 
mobilize game theory, and especially co-opetition game theory [14], to analyses supply chain as an ago-
antagonistic system (AAS), but also to make a theoretical connection between these two theories.  
THE NATURE OF SUPPLY CHAINS AND THEIR MANAGEMENT  
The Nature of Supply Chains: A Hybrid Governance Structure 
The structural typology of governance most used is that proposed by the proponents of the Transaction 
Costs  Theory  (TCT),  initiated  by  Coase  [15]  and  developed  by  Williamson  [11].  Broadly  speaking,  the 
transaction costs are the sum of three fundamental features of exchange between economic actors. These 
elements  are  the  costs  of  coordination  between  different  actors,  risks  relating  to  operations  and  risks  of 
opportunism [16]. Clemons et al. [16] state that coordination costs reflect the costs of information exchange 
(product, demand, inventory, production capacity ...), those related to the integration of this information in the 
decision-making  process,  and  costs  related  to  delays  due  to  communication  problems.  Risks  relating  to 
operations are risks of misinformation or voluntary information withholding. Finally, the risks of opportunism 
include risks relating to the lack of bargaining power or its loss. From this basic principle, companies can 
choose from two forms of governance: an internalization of their activities leading to hierarchy governance, or 
outsourcing  some  of  them  by  a  market  one.  The  first  alternative  mainly  revolves  around  integration 
mechanisms, such as monitoring, procedures or authority. While the second alternative, is mainly a sub-
contract option.  
Though, are to highlight structures that do not have a typical form of governance, those which are midway 
between market and hierarchy. These structures are mainly characterized by network configurations that have 
a particular form of organization. Supply chain is a particular kind of network. It is a hierarchical, dynamic 
and processual network that require both cooperation and competition efforts. This hybrid form of governance 
structure, integrate advantages of both other forms of governance, namely the market and the hierarchy, 
reducing  at  the  same  time,  their  disadvantages.  In  other  words,  companies  remain  legally  independent, 
retaining their identity, their culture and their capabilities, and also a structural flexibility, while being in close 
collaboration with other companies in pursuing their common goals. 
Managing the Supply Chain  
Put simply, SCM is management of material, financial and informational flows from the first supplier to 
end customer. For Mentzer et al. [11] (p.18), ‘Supply chain management is defined as the systemic, strategic 
coordination of the traditional business functions and the tactics across these business functions within a 
particular company and across businesses within the supply chain, for the purposes of improving the long-
term performance of the individual companies and the supply chain as a whole’. Cooper et al. [17] define it as 
an integrative philosophy to manage the total flow of a distribution channel from supplier to the ultimate user. 
The principal objective of SCM is to maximize the value created, not just for one company but for the whole 
supply chain, including the end customer. Therefore, supply chain process integration and re-engineering 
should concern efficiency and effectiveness of all processes across its members [18].   
The issue of integrating the supply chain is not as obvious as some think. The integration of a supply 
chain is not automatic. For Lambert and Cooper [19], it is necessary, first, to identify activities and key 
members to integrate, while recognizing that an excessive integration could be detrimental to the performance 
of the supply chain. Then, since the drivers for integration are situational and different from process link to 
other, the levels of integration differ from link to link, and also vary over time. Finally, the integration of the 
supply chain also depends on certain organizational factors such as: trust, commitment, interdependence, 
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Some researchers stress on the necessary balance between the practice of a lean management and an agile 
one [20]-[21]-[22]. Naylor et al. [20] state that leanness means developing a value stream to eliminate all 
waste, including time, and to ensure a level schedule. While agility means using market knowledge and a 
virtual corporation to exploit profitable opportunities in a volatile marketplace. Fabbe-Costes [22] affirms that 
on one hand, the practice of lean management helps integrating the supply chain by the adaptation of all its 
actors, to ensure cost reduction and improved service level in operational process logic. On the other hand, 
agile management generate flexibility (static and dynamic) and adaptability of processes, organizations and 
supply chains to cope with instability, turbulence, uncertainty and risks in the environment. Likewise, agility 
has been defined as the ability of an organization to quickly respond to changes in demand, both in terms of 
volume and variety [23].  
In supply chain management, integration and outsourcing are both important. This has lead academics and 
professionals to combine lean and agile approaches, producing the concept of ‘leagile’ management [20]. 
Leagile is adopted by positioning the decoupling point so as to best suit the need for responding to a volatile 
demand downstream yet providing level scheduling upstream from the market place [24]. The decoupling 
point is the point that separates activities based on customer orders from those founded on planning and 
forecasting [25].  
THE SUPPLY CHAIN: AN AGO-ANTAGONISTIC SYSTEM  
Ago-antagonistic Systems Approach 
At  its  birth,  the  general  systems  theory  has  come  to  challenge  conventional  physics  and  biology, 
principally by integrating different sciences (natural and social) in the same paradigmatic framework [26]. 
This theory deals about the structure and dynamics of systems, whatever its type: physical, biological or 
social. A system is conceptualized as an integrated whole, which is more than the sum of its parts. It is 
composed of a set of interacting and interdependent elements. The notions of complexity, self-organization, 
homeostasis, teleonomy, immanentism and so on, represent the foundation of the general systems theory. 
Even if this theory claims to conceptual flexibility, its interaction with some sciences made it relatively rigid. 
However, came the theory of Ago-Antagonistic Systems (AAS), which is one of its branches, permitted 
greater flexibility in apprehension of a lot of phenomena.  
AAS approach combines concepts that were usually opposed. The notion ‘ago-antagonistic’ is composed 
of the term ‘antagonistic’, which is employed to indicate the conflictuality of the couple’s poles (opposite or 
only different), and ‘agonistic’, means that conflict has positive and non-destructive effects [27]. In fact, it 
represents  the  association  of  cooperation  and  conflict  in  the  same  phenomenon  and  implicates  bipolar 
strategies  [28].  For  example,  it  combines  complexity  and  simplicity,  self-organization  and  hetero-
organization, homeostasis and homeorhetic, immanentism and transcendence in the same systemic framework.  
According to Bernard-Weil [29][27], this approach is identified through eight (8) principal characteristics. 
The first one is about the definition of an ago-antagonistic couple, whose poles have, in one hand, opposite 
actions on a part of the receiver of these forces; and on the other hand actions in the same direction on the 
other part (or on another receiver). So the ago-antagonistic model is composed of three major things: a couple 
of forces (x and y), a regulator and a receiver. The second characteristic is that the AAS is a dissipative system 
in the sense of Prigogine’s works
3. This is defined by the notion of equilibration against a standard. So 
mathematically, AAS has two equilibrium states: a physiological equilibrium (if the standards are respected) 
or a pathological equilibrium (the model runs on poor followed standards). It does mean that the equilibration 
can be asymptotic, oscillating around the equilibrium point or chaotic. The third characteristic deals with the 
fact that ago-antagonistic combination of elementary models, which are also ago-antagonistic, produces an 
ago-antagonistic network. Primary, the network structure dialectises hierarchy and autonomy. Secondly, it 
explains the fact that an action on one part of the network can rebalance the whole network. The forth one is 
the constituent division, which means that one pole acts for its own interest and at the same time for the 
common one. The fifth feature is that the AAS integrate dichotomies, namely a series of properties normally 
incompatible  with  each  other,  like  open  and  closed,  synchronic  and  diachronic,  simple  and  complex, 
hierarchical and autonomous, realistic and conventional, and so on. The sixth one presents the fact that AAS is 
relative to the notion of pathological homeostasis, or autonomy; that allows understanding what strategies, yet 
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unusual,  ago-antagonist  systemics  may  lead.  The  penultimate  characteristics  deals  with  wrong  ago-
antagonistic  couples,  like  imbalance  and  balance,  good  and  evil,  and  so  forth,  despite  their  semantic 
opposition. The last feature is somewhat difficult to grasp and deals about the complicated apprehension of the 
meta-model of the ago-antagonistic model. Every model, even those claiming to universality, requires a meta-
model [30], and the one of ago-antagonistic model is not yet identified.  
To better apprehend this approach, we present the MMRAAC (Mathematical Model for the Regulation of 
Agonistic Antagonistic Couples) developed by Bernard-Weil [28]: 
First, we have to specify the fact that two conditions allow a normal functioning, that is maintained by a 
homeostatic homeorhetic regulation are:  
 
Knowing that: (  represent a couple of ago-antagonistic features,   is a constant (generally: ) 
characterizing the antagonistic equilibrium, and   is a constant (or a time relative variable) characterizing 












·   
,  : penalty function that permit to keep away from the drift of the limit-cycle of dimension 4 
(  
·  ,  :  state  variables  ;  ,  :  control  variables  ;  ,  ,  m,  n:  constant  parameters  or 
variable in relation to time ;  : a synchronizer ;  ,  : respectively antagonistic and agonistic 
forces.  
·           
.                                     
Supply Chain: An Ago-antagonistic System 
When we analyze supply chains through AAS theory, we find that it has most of the characteristics 
presented above. The first characteristic was about the definition of ago-antagonistic couples. The study of 
supply chain strategies allowed us to identify some ago-antagonistic couples, like lean strategy versus agile 
strategy, integration versus outsourcing or hierarchy versus market strategy, reactive versus proactive strategy 
and cooperative versus competitive strategy.  
The first one deals about leanness and agility. We saw earlier that these two strategic poles are conflictual, 
but their conflictuality has positive and non-destructive effects. Integrating leanness and agility gives us a 
leagility which represent a bipolar strategy. It permits to integrate the fact of having a level schedule by 
eliminating non-value added time, and at the same time best suit fluctuating demand by additional reduction 
of value-added time via production technology breakthroughs [20]-[31]. The second one is about integration 
versus outsourcing. When combined, these two contrasted strategies produce positive and non-destructive 
effect. In more specific terms, the search of taper integration by matching vertical integration and strategic 
outsourcing extends a company’s product portfolio and success, which in turn allows the development of a 
competitive advantage and thus contribute to performance [32]. The third one deals about reactive versus 
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constructive effect. In this sense, Lambrechts et al. [33] state that proactive-reactive scheduling entail an 
assortment of a proactive strategy that insures a protected baseline schedule with a reactive strategy that allow 
to cope with the schedule infeasibilities caused by the distortions when the schedule is performed. The last 
ago-antagonistic  couple  is  cooperative  and  competitive  strategy.  These  two  strategies  are  obviously 
heterogeneous; however they constitute a bipolar strategy that has constructive and positive effects. Indeed, 
for Dagnino and Padula [34], the coopetitive perspective come from the fact that both processes of value 
creation and value sharing occur, allowing the emergence of partially convergent interest structure where both 
competitive and cooperative strategies are performed at the same time and exactingly interrelated. 
The  second  characteristic,  which  deals  about the fact  that  an  ago-antagonistic  model  is  a  dissipative 
system, is verified in supply chains. Actually, supply chain equilibrium is not static. In other words, there isn’t 
just a single equilibrium. There is a set of plausible equilibria [35], oscillating around a mean. The third one, 
dealing with ago-antagonistic network, is also verified by the fact that the supply chain is composed of ago-
antagonistic couples that constitute an ago-antagonistic network. Furthermore, regulating action on one couple 
may rebalance the overall network. The fourth characteristic, concerning constituent division, is perceptible 
because  of  the  hybridization  of  the  supply  chain  structure.  Actually,  entities  in  supply  chains  are 
heterogeneous and have different objectives and constraints, but when it comes to performance of the whole 
chain, they become extremely inter-dependant in achieving such objectives as cost, quality or delay ones [36]. 
The fifth characteristic is about dichotomies. In supply chain as an AAS, couples represent dichotomies, like 
cooperation and competition that have a series of properties in principle incompatible with each other but they 
remain as in real systems that appear to comply with. In other terms, everyone seeks the benefit until it is 
moderated by system regulations. The sixth feature which treats about pathological autonomy or homeostasis 
is  noticeable  in  a  supply  chain.  Supply  chain  approach  lead  to  strategies  that  were  unusual  in  business 
strategies, and to which an ago-antagonist approach may also lead. The seventh characteristic deals about 
wrong or false ago-antagonistic couples. In a supply chain approach, we, generally, do not combine wrong 
ago-antagonistic couples to generate a bipolar strategy. We do use couples that even if they are contrasted, can 
have positive and constructive effects. The last characteristic is about the meta-model of the supply chain 
approach. We consider that the meta-model of the supply chain one is the network model. As long as we 
consider that the supply chain is a specific type of network, network theory remains the meta-model of the 
supply chain approach. 
Finally,  when  we  analyze  these  characteristics,  we  find  that  the  supply  chain  is  an  ago-antagonistic 
system. Furthermore, we can say that this concept derives its strength from the fact that the approach leads to 
the implementation of bipolar strategies, known in other paradigms as opposing strategies. 
SUPPLY CHAIN THROUGH CO-OPETITION GAME THEORY LENS 
Co-opetition Game Theory 
Game  theory  represents  an  important  tool  for  the  apprehension  of  player’s  behaviors  in  strategic 
situations. It deals with a lot of kinds of games such as symmetric and asymmetric games, zero-sum and non-
zero-sum games, simultaneous and sequential games, perfect information and imperfect information games, 
discrete and continuous games, one-player and multi-player games and cooperative or non-cooperative games. 
In this point, we focus our interest more on this last type of games, which are cooperative and non-cooperative 
games.  
Cooperative games are games in which players can make binding commitments before choosing their 
strategies, whereas in non-cooperative games they don’t. The concept of non-cooperative game theory may, 
wrongly, mean that there is no place for cooperation, and the concept of cooperative game theory might also 
mean that conflict or competition does not exist [37]. If we deepen a little more the typology, we can have 
cooperative games with conflict and cooperative games without conflict, and also non-cooperative games with 
conflict and non-cooperative games without conflict [38]. Until the end of the 90s, business strategies were 
analyzed compared to a single type of game. However, in the second half of 90s, complex organizational 
structures have been multiplied, making strategic behaviors more problematic.  
In 1995 and 1996, Adam M. Brandenburger from Harvard Business School and Barry J. Nalebuff from 
Yale School of Management have proposed an original and more realistic concept that was conceptualized 
‘co-opetition’, joining two opposite strategic behaviors, namely cooperation and competition. Their approach 
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business concerns. For Brandenburger and Nalebuff [14]-[39], co-opetition game theory is a theory of value, 
from  which  companies  can  create  value  by  cooperation  process,  and  at  the  same  time  capture  value  by 
competition one. So, both processes are important for companies. They state principally that in business, it’s 
not like in other games such as sport games or others games where there is always a winner and a loser (or no 
winner and no loser). In business, all parts of the game can win or lose. In this way, Lado et al. [12] develop a 
model which is closed to that of Brandenburger and Nalebuff [14]. They call it ‘syncretic model of rent-
seeking strategic behavior’. This model allows understanding that high collaboration and competition are 
required to reach the syncretic rent-seeking behavior, which is a simultaneous pursuit of both competitive and 
cooperative strategies. However, Armstrong [40] states that the approach of Brandenburger and Nalebuff [14] 
is not really new, even if words are new. He added that the adoption of the game theory to business games and 
the combination of such strategies in the way they have done remain its strength.  
Co-opetition in a Supply Chain as an Ago-antagonistic System 
As we have seen above, cooperation and competition represent an ago-antagonistic couple in the supply 
chain, since on one hand they are viewed as a paradox, and on the other hand this paradoxical combination has 
positive  and  non-destructive  effects.  Co-opetition  is  defined  as  a  process  in  which  ﬁrms  simultaneously 
compete in some areas and cooperate in others [41]. In supply chains, both cooperation and competition are 
important, and two logics are necessary. The first one is a transactional logic, which is generally characterized 
by competition behaviors, and the second one is relational, and is characterized commonly by cooperation 
strategies.  
In a supply chain, firms search for common benefits by pooling complimentary resources, skills, and 
capabilities [12]. Hall and Potts [42] show that cooperation between a producer and its supplier may reduce 
the total cost, which depends on their scheduling objectives. However, benefits generated by cooperation must 
be fairly distributed among  members, otherwise regulations and adjustments are needed to rebalance the 
whole chain [43]. This added to the fact that relationships between companies entail a complex interaction 
between ex-ante cooperation to mutually create value and ex-post self-interested bargaining to capture value 
[44]. So we can understand from this that there is always a part of competition in a given relationship.  
Cooperation and competition coexist ago-antagonistically in a supply chain. The fact that the supply chain 
represents a dynamic network, made it more exposed to variations and instabilities giving rise to conflicts, or 
opportunistic  behaviors,  because  of  the  uncertainty  and  ambiguity  of  certain  situations.  This  generates 
paradoxically a certain need for cooperation and collaboration. In fact, these two forces, namely cooperation 
and competition, act ago-antagonistically on the supply chain members. This led us to say that coopetition 
strategies represent ago-antagonistic solutions for managing the supply chain.  
If  we  consider  that,  in  a  supply  chain,  the  two  ago-antagonistic  conditions  (1)  and  (2)  seen  above 
(  and  ;  : cooperation,  : competition) are satisfied, the supply chain is characterized 
by a normal dynamical equilibrium of   and   maintained by one of the known methods of regulations. This 
regulation can be performed by traditional methods, namely passive regulation methods (buffer inventory, 
service rate and financial models) or active regulation ones (option value, search of internal flexibility); or by 
modern methods of uncertainty regulation, namely outsourcing and the development of external flexibility, or 
external risk management through a collaborative mode of exchange [45].  
Otherwise, if the supply chain displays a deviation from the ‘average’, caused by a force that gives rise to 
an abnormal fluctuation, the supply chain may stabilize, by an altered regulation, in a pathological dynamical 
equilibrium between   and  . In this situation we have either   or  , or both of them. 
Here, to insure a new homeostatic homeorhetic rule, we bring the supply chain to a new critical point with 
,   . 
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Evidence of Co-opetition from Supply Chain Management Literature  
A lot of works have been done to materialize bipolar strategies adopted by organizations in different 
logistics and supply chain management fields. Concerning sourcing strategies, some companies adopt hybrid 
sourcing  strategies,  known  as  parallel  sourcing  strategies  [49].  This  kind  of  bilateral  strategy  integrates 
cooperation and competition in the same rational. It permits a company to establish cooperative relationships 
with  each  supplier,  while  maintaining  competition  between  them  [50].  In  this  way,  Richardson  [49] 
demonstrates, in a study of Japanese automobile industry using game theory, that parallel sourcing is better 
than sole sourcing depends on the sum of the setup costs for parallel source opposed to the lower trading and 
competitiveness costs resulting from higher supplier performance. 
Likewise, as we saw above, leagile manufacturing strategies, integrating a lean and an agile vision are 
more  and  more  adopted  by  companies,  by  shifting  the  decoupling  point  according  to  their  objectives, 
capabilities and constraints. Naylor et al. [20] demonstrates that, in a PC manufacturing, companies definitely 
combine the two paradigms, using the decoupling point as a buffer between the variable demand for the 
paramount part of products and the level production schedule for some of the components. Qi et al. [51] 
support this argument by confirming that in some situations, these approaches can be combined together to 
enable a total supply chain strategy, which includes the best of both of them. But in this kind of strategy, game 
theory  is  not  much  used,  and  even  less  co-opetition  game  theory.  However,  we  think  that  in  this  case, 
coopetition strategy can refer to leagile strategy. As Naylor et al. [20] state, leanness means developing a 
value  stream  to  eliminate  all  waste,  including  time,  and  to  ensure  a  level  schedule.  This  requires  close 
cooperation between the different members of the supply chain to ensure such a paradigm. On the other hand, 
agility means using market knowledge and a virtual corporation to exploit profitable opportunities in a volatile 
marketplace [20]. This is a strategy which is based more on a competition spirit and value-capturing within the 
chain. But we do believe that the coopetition game theory fits more cases where, for example, there is a 
supplier which manufactures the same component for two competitors. Here, companies cooperate on some of 
their manufacturing activities, while competing in others, such as marketing, sales, etc.  
IT strategies can also be good examples. Chin [52] studied the chemical process industries in American 
companies.  Coopetition  strategies  were  principally  characterized  by  the  establishment  of  a  kind  of  e-
marketplaces, namely e-hub, to connect multiple buyers to multiple suppliers by linking their ERP (Enterprise 
Resource Planning) systems. This e-hub is an inter-organizational system that permits competing companies 
to cooperate within their supply chain. This ago-antagonistic strategy enhanced performance of a big number 
of supply chain members.  
Concerning inventory, Cachon and Zipskin [53] studied competitive and cooperative inventory policies in 
a two-stage supply chain using game theory. They demonstrate that games have generally a unique Nash 
equilibrium that differs from the optimal solution. They conclude from this point that competition reduces 
efficiency. Moreover, they show that value of cooperation is context speciﬁc. They stipulate that in some 
settings competition increases total cost by only a fraction of a percent, whereas in other settings the cost 
increase is enormous. So companies have to find a consensus on how the total cost will be allocated, and this 
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The principal aim of this article is a theoretical approximation of two major approaches in order to better 
apprehend the supply chain dynamics. The first approach belongs to the systemic nebula, but is a bit original. 
Known as ago-antagonistic system theory, it allows us to see that systems are subject to paradoxical forces, 
but that their combination produces a positive and non-destructive effect. The second approach is a game 
theoretical one, and combines cooperation and competition games, that are commonly two opposite strategic 
behaviors, into a coopetition ones. It integrates the fact that firms tend to create value (by cooperation) and 
capture value (by competition) in the same time. So, they behave in such way that they can simultaneously 
satisfy their own interests and the common interests of the supply chain.  
These approaches are perfectly suited to the paradigmatic context of the supply chain. So, developing a 
common analytical framework seems quite fecund for further research. This will allow understanding a lot of 
supply  chain  phenomena,  like  those  evoked  above,  by  conceptualizing  bipolar  strategies  as  an  ago-
antagonistic solution for supply chain requirements and its member’s behavior. The second one is the need of 
the development of a mathematical model of members’ differentiated behavior based on MMRAAC. This 
non-linear differential equation model will permit approximately to predict members’ behavior and strategy. 
Also, the integration of the concept of pathological equilibrium in a game theoretical framework opens a door 
to  future  conceptual  exploration.  This  can  be  applied  to  the  supply  chain  framework,  after  having 
distinguished its characteristics within an organized complexity or within a chaotic (or desorganized) one. 
Finally, the development of a common mathematical model between MMRAAC and the game theory allows a 
more  detailed  and  quantifiable  understanding  of  coopetition  as  an  ago-antagonist  concept  within  supply 
chains. 
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